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Abstract. In the macroeconomic literature, the implications of a context with
household heterogeneity and incomplete ﬁnancial markets have been mostly studied un-
der the assumption that households own the physical capital and undertake the intertem-
poral investment decision. Further, ﬁrms rent capital and labor from the households to
maximize period proﬁts. The present paper provides the conditions under which this as-
sumption is still irrelevant when markets are incomplete. It shows that, if ﬁrms own the
physical capital and undertake the investment decision to maximize their asset value, in
the sense that they discount future cash ﬂows with positive state price processes that are
consistent with security prices, the equilibrium allocations are the same as in the stan-
dard setting with static ﬁrms. On the other hand, the ﬁrm valuation of future cash ﬂows
only coincides with the valuation of the unconstrained shareholders. Given this, value
maximization may still lead to shareholder disagreement in the presence of eﬀectively
binding portfolio restrictions.
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1. Introduction
Following Bewley (1986), an extensive literature has studied the implications of models with
heterogeneous agents and incomplete ﬁnancial markets. Among others, Aiyagari (1994),
Huggett (1997), Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001a, 2001b, 2004) and Krusell and Smith
(1997, 1998) have analyzed the eﬀects of such a framework on the aggregate savings rate, the
shape of the wealth distribution, the portfolio asset returns, and the welfare costs of business
cycles.
An important assumption shared by the previous models is that households are the
owners of the capital stock and undertake the intertemporal investment decision. Further,
ﬁrms simply rent capital and labor from the households to maximize proﬁts period by period.
Whereas this assumption is innocuous under complete markets, things are very diﬀerent when
markets are incomplete. In particular, if one assumes instead that ﬁrms own the physical
capital and decide on the optimal investment level, the usual share value maximization
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objective is no longer well deﬁned. This is due to the fact that the available markets do
not provide suﬃcient information to value future streams of resources unambiguously. In
addition, shareholders’ evaluations of diﬀerent investment alternatives might diﬀer from those
of the ﬁrms, and shareholder disagreement may result in equilibrium.1
This paper extends to an incomplete markets setting the result, well known under com-
plete markets, that capital ownership is irrelevant. In other words, it shows that equilibria
are the same wether the agents own the capital and rent it to the ﬁrm, or wether the ﬁrm,
considered as an inﬁnitely lived corporation that is owned by the agents as shareholders,
holds the capital stock. Apart from identifying the particular ﬁrm objective that yields the
same equilibrium as in the standard setting, we discuss the conditions under which this ob-
jective can be supported by the shareholders, contributing to a large strand of literature on
shareholder unanimity that has been mostly developed in a static or two period setup.
The framework for our analysis is an inﬁnite horizon economy with one good, aggregate
uncertainty, idiosyncratic risk and sequential trading subject to general portfolio restrictions.
With respect to the primitives of the economy, our results require constant returns to scale
in production and the standard assumption that households are impatient, which implies
convergence of present value sums and rules out price bubbles in equilibrium. To prove this
last result in our setting, we follow Santos and Woodford (1997), who analyze the existence
of price bubbles in exchange economies. In addition, we require value maximization from
the part of the ﬁrms when making the investment decision.
As stated earlier, the main problem with the objective of the ﬁrm when markets are
incomplete arises due to the lack of suﬃcient information to value future streams of resources.
In particular, a model with incomplete markets and value maximization must incorporate
a ﬁrm valuation function that reﬂects its beliefs about future prices. The approach taken
by authors like DeMarzo (1988, 1993) and Duﬃe and Shaﬀer (1986b) is to discount future
cash ﬂows with a present value process that is consistent with security prices, in the sense
that they satisfy a no arbitrage relation between the security prices and their one period
payoﬀs. On the other hand, recognizing that value maximization according to consistent
present value prices might lead to shareholder disagreement, a second group of authors (see
e.g. Dreze (1974, 1985), DeMarzo (1993), and Grossmann and Hart (1979)) have suggested
to discount future cash ﬂows with a weighted sum of the marginal rates of substitution of
the diﬀerent shareholders, where the weights reﬂect the general shareholder composition.
Finally, a third group of authors (see e.g. Radner (1972a), Sandmo (1972), Sondermann
(1974) or Leland (1972)) have simply assumed the existence of a utility function for the ﬁrm
deﬁned exogenously over proﬁts.
In the present paper, we ﬁrst assume a general objective for the ﬁrm that nests the
diﬀerent approaches as particular cases. Further, a competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as
an allocation where both households and ﬁrms optimize. We then show that, under value
maximization, the equilibrium allocations are the same irrespective of who (households or
ﬁrms) owns the physical capital stock. In other words, if the discount factor of the ﬁrm belongs
to the set of consistent present value prices, a value maximizing competitive equilibrium is
also an equilibrium in the standard setting where ﬁrms maximize period proﬁts. Conversely,
an equilibrium in the standard setting is a value maximizing equilibrium in a setting where
1Note that this problem does not arise if one assumes privately owned ﬁrms, as in Angeletos (2005) and
Angeletos and Calvet (2003, 2004, 2005).
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ﬁrms make the intertemporal investment decision. Moreover, these results can be extended
to a more general framework that allows for heterogeneous ﬁrms and external ﬁnancing of
the investment level.
Several remarks are worth noting. First, if the set of consistent present value processes
that constitutes an equilibrium with value maximization is not a singleton, the economy
with value maximizing ﬁrms might generate indeterminacy with respect to the ﬁrm discount
factor. On the other hand, since our previous results imply that the dimension of the
set of equilibria with value maximization is the same as in the standard setting, we can
establish that the equilibrium will be invariant with respect to the ﬁrm’s discount factor if
the equilibrium with one period lived ﬁr m si su n i q u e .
Second, the previous equilibrium concept does not take into account the ownership struc-
ture of the ﬁrm. Given this, we deﬁne a value maximizing competitive equilibrium with
shareholder agreement as one where the valuation of future cash ﬂows of the ﬁrm coincides
with the valuation of the shareholders. We show that only the shareholders who are uncon-
strained every period agree with a value maximizing production plan, since their marginal
rates of substitution (or valuation of future proﬁts) also belong to the set of consistent present
value processes. In our companion paper (Carceles-Poveda and Coen-Pirani, 2005), instead
of postulating a particular objective for the dynamic ﬁrm, we explicitly address the question
of unanimity among shareholders. We do so, by ﬁrst deriving the investment decision that an
arbitrary shareholder would make if he were the unique owner of the ﬁrm. We then demon-
strate that, if portfolio restrictions on shareholders do not bind, all of the ﬁrm’s shareholders
would agree on its optimal level of investment.
Shareholder disagreement with respect to value maximization opens the possibility for
assuming other objectives for the ﬁrm that could potentially have diﬀerent quantitative
implications to the ones established in the literature. As an example, authors like Aiyagari
(1994), Huggett (1997) or Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) have shown that imperfect risk
sharing in the standard setting with one period lived ﬁrms can lead to an increase in the
aggregate capital stock due to precautionary savings motives. Our results suggest, however,
that the aggregate household savings in an economy where ﬁrms do not maximize their
market value need not be the same as the aggregate capital stock. This is due to the
fact that, in such a setting, the equivalence between the stock of physical capital and the
market value of ﬁrm is broken, and precautionary savings are not necessarily reﬂected on the
aggregate capital stock. A quantitative assessment of the importance of capital ownership
in such a setting is an important issue that we leave for further research.
Our work is also related to the existing general equilibrium literature on incomplete
markets with an inﬁnite horizon, where authors like Hernandez and Santos (1996), Levine
(1989), Magill and Quinzii (1994a,1994b) or Levine and Zame (1996) have established the
existence of an equilibrium in exchange economies. In addition, Duﬃe and Shaﬀer (1986b)
have analyzed shareholder agreement and the existence and optimality of equilibrium in a
general incomplete markets framework with production. An analysis of the existence and
optimality of the equilibrium in the presence of production is outside the scope of the present
paper. We believe, however, that our work does contribute to the understanding of produc-
tion in inﬁnite horizon economies with incomplete ﬁnancial markets, while establishing a
bridge between the general equilibrium macro-ﬁnance literature and the existing shareholder
unanimity literature mentioned above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the model
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and section three discusses the main equivalence results. These are further discussed in
section four, and section ﬁve summarizes and concludes.
2. The Model Economies
This section presents the diﬀerent model economies. We ﬁrst introduce the common general
environment. Next, we discuss two production economies where the investment level is
optimally determined depending on the ownership of the physical capital stock.2 Throughout
the section, we mostly adopt the notation of Santos and Woodford (1997).
2.1. The General Environment. We consider an inﬁnite horizon economy with aggre-
gate uncertainty, idiosyncratic income shocks and sequential trading. Time is discrete and
indexed by t =0 ,1,2... Further, the resolution of uncertainty is represented by an informa-
tion structure or event-tree N. Each node or date-state st ∈ N, summarizing the history of
the environment through and including date t,h a saﬁnite number S(st) of immediate suc-
cessors. We use the notation sr|st with r ≥ t to indicate that node sr belongs to the sub-tree
with root st. Further, with the exception of the unique root node s0 dated at t =0 ,e a c h
node has a unique predecessor dated at t − 1, which we denote by st−1. The probability of
date-event st at period zero is denoted by π(st),w i t hπ(s0)=1 , since the initial realization
s0 is given. In addition, π(sr|st) denotes the probability of sr given st. Throughout the






Technology. At each node st ∈ N, there exists a spot market for a single consumption
good y(st), produced with the following aggregate technology:
y(st)=f(z(st),k(st−1),n(st)) (1)
where k(st−1) ∈ R+ and n(st) ∈ R+ denote the aggregate physical capital and labor, z
¡
st¢
is an aggregate productivity shock, and the initial stock of capital k(s−1) ∈ R++ is given.
We make the following assumptions.
(A.1) The technology shock follows a stationary (Markov) process with state space Sz =
{zm : m ∈ Mz, zm ∈ [z,z]},w h e r eMz is a ﬁnite set of integers, 0 <z< z<+∞,a n dt h e
initial realization z(s0) is given.
(A.2) Given z, the production function f(z,·,·):R2
+ → R+ is continuously diﬀerentiable
on the interior of its domain, strictly increasing, strictly quasiconcave, and homogeneous
of degree one in the two arguments. We also assume that f(z,0,n)=0 , fk(z,k,n) >
0 and fn(z,k,n) > 0 for all k>0 and n>0. Further, limk→0 fk(z,k,n)=∞ and
limk→∞ fk(z,k,n)=0for all n>0.
The previous two assumptions are standard in the macroeconomic literature. Assumption
(A.1) models the technology shock as a stationary Markov chain. Here, it is important to
note that our results only require that the shock takes a ﬁnite number of positive values, and
we can therefore relax the Markov assumption. Further, assumption (A.2) imposes standard
conditions on the production process. In particular, the homogeneity assumption implies
2Whereas the analysis assumes the existence of a representative ﬁr m( o ral a r g en u m b e ro fi d e n t i c a lﬁrms)
and no external ﬁnancing of the investment level, our results can also be extended to the cases where ﬁrms
are heterogeneous and where investment is ﬁnanced with external funds. This will be further discussed in a
later section.
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that f(z,k,n)=fk(z,k,n)k+fn(z,k,n)n via Euler’s theorem. As we will see later, this last
property is crucial to obtain our results.
The aggregate capital stock depreciates at the rate δ ∈ (0,1), and we denote the total
supply of goods available from production at st including undepreciated capital by:
F(z(st),k(st−1),n(st)) = f(z(st),k(st−1),n(st)) + (1 − δ)k(st−1). (2)
Financial Markets. At each date-state st, there exist spot markets for a ﬁnite number
L of securities. The ﬁrst is a claim to productive activity that is indexed by l =1 .T h er e s t
are ﬁnancial assets whose returns are denominated in units of the consumption good.
A security l ∈ L traded at st is deﬁned by its current price ql(st) ∈ R+ and by the payoﬀs
it promises to deliver at future nodes. Holding a portfolio of securities a(st−1) ∈ RL at the




if date-state st is realized, where q(st)=( q1(st),...,qL(st))0 and d(st)=( d1(st),...,d L(st))
are the vectors of prices and dividends respectively.3
A security traded at st is of ﬁnite maturity if there exists a date T such that Rl(sr|st)=0
for all sr|st with r ≥ T. Otherwise, the security is inﬁnitely lived. Further, security markets
are one period complete at node st if the rank of the matrix deﬁned by [R(st+1)0]st+1|st,w h e r e
one row corresponds to R(st+1)0 for each node st+1|st,i se q u a lt oS(st). Moreover, markets
a r ec o m p l e t ei ft h e ya r eo n ep e r i o dc o m p l e t ea te v e r yd a t e - s t a t e . W em a k et h ef o l l o w i n g
assumptions.
(A.3) For all st ∈ N, d(st) ∈ R+.
(A.4) L ≤ S(st) at all st ∈ N.
Assumption (A.3) requires that dividends are nonnegative, and it makes sense with
nonnegative security prices, implied by the free disposal of securities. As we will see later,
the dividends on the productive claim in the two production economies will be equal to the
residual of output net of investment and labor income, given by the marginal product of
labor multiplied by the total labor supply. Given this, assumption (A.3) will impose the













Clearly, a necessary condition for markets to be complete is that L ≥ S(st) at all st ∈
N. On the other hand, since we are particularly interested in the case where markets are
incomplete, assumption (A.4) limits the number of available assets at each node.
No Arbitrage Pricing. The security price process q is arbitrage free at st if there does
not exist a portfolio a(st) ∈ RL such that R(st+1)0a(st) ≥ 0 for all st+1|st and q(st)0a(st) ≤ 0,
with at least one strict inequality. In other words, arbitrage free prices have to be such that
it is not possible to construct a portfolio with non-positive value and nonnegative payoﬀs
at every successor node. While this must be the case in equilibrium, the presence of no
arbitrage at date-state st implies the existence of positive present value prices λ(st) > 0 and
3Note that we are abstracting from securities that pay bundles of other securities and from trade in
diﬀerent securities at diﬀerent date-states, although this can be easily incorporated at the expense of additional

















st∈N for the entire information structure such that the previous no arbitrage
equation holds. In what follows, we denote the set of such processes for the sub-tree with
root st by Qst(q,d). Further, we deﬁne λsr
t = λ(sr)/λ(st) for sr|st to simplify notation.
Note that the present value ratios λst+1
t that are consistent with security prices are uniquely
determined by (4) if markets are complete. On the other hand, the number of linearly
independent equations is not suﬃcient to uniquely determine the ratios when markets are
incomplete.
The previous present value prices can be used to evaluate future streams of consumption
goods. In particular, for a non-negative stream x that speciﬁes x(st) ∈ R+ for all st ∈ N,









Similarly, we can deﬁne the fundamental value vdl(st,λ) of security l with respect to some
λ ∈ Qst(q,d). In addition, using some algebra, the bubble component of the security with
respect to λ ∈ Qst(q,d) can be expressed as:






As shown by Santos and Woodford (1987), if a security price is non-negative, its funda-
mental value vdl(st,λ) satisﬁes 0 ≤ vdl(st,λ) ≤ ql(st) for all λ ∈ Qst(q,d). Further, whereas
the fundamental value need not be the same for all state prices satisfying equation (4),
the authors show that it must lie between the ﬁnite bounds4 vdl(st,λ)=i n f λ vdl(st,λ) and
vdl(st,λ)=s u p λ vdl(st,λ). Note that there unambiguously exists no bubble for security l ∈ L
if vdl(sr,λ)=vdl(sr,λ)=ql(sr). In this case, the fundamental value is uniquely deﬁned for
all λ ∈ Qst(q,d).
Households. The economy is populated by a countable set of inﬁnitely lived house-
holds I. Households’ preferences %=( %i)i∈I over consumption plans ci satisfy the following
assumption.












4These results follow from Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 in Santos and Woodford (1997), which can be directly
applied to our setup.
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where βi ∈ (0,1) is the individual discount factor, and the period utility function ui : R+ → R
is strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuously diﬀerentiable in the interior of its
domain, with limci→0 u0
i(ci)=∞ and limci→∞ u0
i(ci)=0 .
Assumption (A.5) is standard in the macroeconomic literature, and it implies that house-
holds have a suﬃcient degree of impatience. In other words, they are willing to give up a
fraction of their future consumption to have more consumption today. The presence of a
suﬃcient degree of impatience has been assumed by several authors studying inﬁnite horizon
exchange economies with incomplete markets, such as Santos and Woodford (1997), Hernan-
dez and Santos (1996), Levine and Zame (1996) or Magill and Quinzii (1994a) and (1994b).
As we will see later, it will be crucial to establish the absence of price bubbles in the present
setup.
Each household i ∈ I enters the markets at t =0with a ﬁnite initial endowment al
i(s−1)
of each security, whose sum across households determines the net supply of the security at
each node, which we denote by Al =
P
i∈I al
i(s−1). Without loss of generality, the supply of
the productive claim and of the rest of securities is normalized to one and zero respectively,
and we let A =( A1,...,A L)0. At each date-state st ∈ N, households are also endowed with
one unit of time that is entirely allocated to labor, and which they can transform into  i(st)
eﬃciency labor units that will be used to produce output in exchange of wages. Given this,
the labor income of the household at st is given by wi(st)=w(st) i(st),w h e r ew(st) is the
fraction of output allocated to labor payments. We make the following assumptions.
(A.6) For all i ∈ I, ai(s−1) ∈ R+.
(A.7) The labor income shock  i follows a stationary (Markov) process with state space
S  = { im : m ∈ M ,  im ∈ [ , ]},w h e r eM  is a ﬁnite set of integers, 0 < <  <1,a n dt h e
initial realization  i(s0) is given.
Assumption (A.6) guarantees that the supply of each security is non-negative. Further,
assumption (A.7) models the labor income shock as a discrete state Markov chain. As
before, our results only require that the shock takes a ﬁnite number of positive values, and
we can therefore relax the Markov assumption. The aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks could
potentially be correlated, and we denote their joint transition matrix by Π in what follows.
At each node st,h o u s e h o l di ∈ I chooses consumption ci(st) ∈ R+ and a portfolio of
securities ai(st) ∈ RL subject to the following constraints:
ci(st)+q(st)0ai(st) ≤ ωi(st) (6)
ωi(st+1)=wi(st+1)+R(st+1)0ai(st) (7)
q(st)0ai(st) ≥ Bi(st) (8)
equation (6) is the standard budget constraint with sequential markets and equation (7)
is the law of motion of the individual wealth ωi(st).A tt =0 , equation (7) takes the same
form with ωi(s0)=q0(s0)ai(s−1)+d1(s0)a1
i(s−1)+wi(s0), where we have used the fact that
dl(s0)=0for l ≥ 2. Finally, to avoid Ponzi schemes, equation (8) imposes a ﬁnite limit of
Bi(st) on the total amount that households can borrow at every node5.
5Note that we could also impose constraints on the individual asset holdings, since market clearing implies
that in every asset market and every node there exists at least one household that is unconstrained.
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A particular trading restriction that one can impose is the present value constraint,w h i c h
is eﬀectively never binding at any ﬁnite date. In particular, it is the tightest borrowing limit
such that the portfolio holdings satisfy the budget constraint with ci(st) ∈ R+ for all st ∈ N,
and wealth is always non-negative after a ﬁnite date. As shown by Santos and Woodford
(1997), this constraint can be formally speciﬁed as:
Bi(st)=−vwi(st,λ) where vwi(st,λ)= i n f
λ∈Qst(q,d)
vwi(st,λ) (9)
In essence, the restriction implies that households can borrow at most the lowest present
value of their individual endowments in order to be solvent. The two production economies
are described in what follows.
2.2. The k-economy. In the k-economy, we make the usual assumption in the macro-
ﬁnance literature, implying that households are the owners of the physical capital stock
and make the inter-temporal investment decision. In this case, the problem of the ﬁrm is
particularly simple. At each date-state st, after observing the realization of the productivity
shock z,t h eﬁrm chooses capital and labor to maximize period proﬁts. Thus, it solves a
sequence of static problems:
Max{k,n}F(z(st),k(st−1),n(st)) − w(st)n(st) − r(st)k(st−1) (10)
leading to the following necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst order conditions:
w(st)=Fn(z(st),k(st−1),n(st)) = fn(z(st),k(st−1),n(st)) (11)
r(st)=Fk(z(st),k(st−1),n(st)) = fk(z(st),k(st−1),n(st)) + 1 − δ (12)
where w(st) ∈ R+ and r(st) ∈ R+ are the competitively determined wage and gross capital
rental rates respectively. Further, each household i ∈ I maximizes the preferences in (A.5)















i(st) ≥ Bi(st) (15)
In the previous equations, ki(st) is the amount of physical capital held by the household at
the end of period t, illustrating the fact that households make the inter-temporal investment
decision. If we denote by ki(s−1) and ai(s−1) the initial asset holdings of i at t =0 ,t h ep e r i o d
zero budget constraint takes the same form with ωi(s0)=wi(s0)+r(s0)ki(s−1)+q(s0)ai(s−1).
A k-economy is speciﬁed by a set of preferences %, a transition matrix Π,i n i t i a lv a l -












and borrowing limits B =( Bi)i∈I,w h e r ea1
i(s−1)=ki(s−1)/k(s−1) represents the initial
endowment of capital shares of household i ∈ I.A k-economy is therefore described by
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Ek = {%,(k0,a 0,z 0,  0),Π,d a,B}.












is a CE for





is optimal under the preferences % given
¡
ql¢
l≥2, (w,r), (k0,a 0,z 0,  0), Π, da and B (ii)















Before discussing the framework with dynamic ﬁrms, it is important to note that the
constraints faced by the household sector in the k-economy can be directly mapped into
the framework of the general environment if we deﬁne the shares of physical capital held
by household i at date-state st as a1
i(st)=ki(st)/k(st). With this normalization, the total
supply of shares is positive and equal to A1 =1 . Further, q1(st)=k(st), R1(st+1)=
r(st+1)k(st) and d1(st)=r(st)k(st−1)−k(st)=F(z(st),k(st−1),n(st))−w(st)n(st)−k(st).
The e-Economy. In the e-economy, we assume that the ﬁrm owns the entire stock of
capital and undertakes the inter-temporal investment decision by solving a dynamic opti-
mization problem. Further, households are entitled to the future dividend payments through
their ownership of a perfectly divisible equity share in the ﬁrm that is traded at price q1 ¡
st¢
.
At each node st, households maximize the preferences in (A.5) subject to constraints
(6)-(8). Further, the ﬁrm produces output, pays wages to the total labor employed and
decides on the amount of investment. Investment is entirely ﬁnanced with retained earnings,
and the residual of gross proﬁts (output net of labor payments) and investment is paid out
as dividends to the ﬁrm equity owners, i.e.,
d1(st)=F(z(st),k(st−1),n(st)) − w(st)n(st) − k(st)=Nf(st) (16)
where Nf(st) is the net cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm. Unfortunately, the deﬁnition of an appropriate
ﬁrm objective is more complicated than before, since the standard approach, that ﬁrms
maximize their share value, is not well speciﬁed under market incompleteness. The reason
is that the available markets do not provide suﬃcient information to value future dividend
streams unambiguously. To see this, consider the case of eﬀective complete markets and
let mst+r
t be the t + r-period ahead pricing kernel. Note that mst+r
t represents the period t
price of one unit of time t + r consumption, contingent on the economy being at date-state
st+r|st. Since all the shareholders will agree on the pricing kernel under complete markets,














for all i ∈ I
As usual when markets are complete, the ﬁrm maximizes the present discounted value
of its net cash ﬂows, using as a discount factor the unique present value process of its
shareholders, which is also the only element of the set Qst(q,d). In addition, both the agents
and the ﬁrm value future output in each state identically, and all shareholders will therefore
agree with the investment choice made by the ﬁrm. On the other hand, since a unique
present value process that is consistent with market prices is not necessarily available under
market incompleteness, the previous objective is no longer well deﬁned, and shareholder
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disagreement may result in equilibrium.
In what follows, we brieﬂy discuss some of the approaches that have been proposed in
the literature following the seminal paper of Diamond (1967). Moreover, a discussion of
shareholder agreement in the present setup is provided in a later section6
Value Maximization. As noted by DeMarzo (1993), a natural generalization of the
previous Arrow Debreu ﬁrm objective to an incomplete markets setup is to require ﬁrms to
maximize the value of their output according to some consistent present value prices, in the
sense that they satisfy the no arbitrage condition in (4). The two period value maximizing








t Nf(st+r) for some λ ∈ Qst(q,d) (17)
This approach has also been followed by DeMarzo (1988) and Duﬃe and Shaﬀer (1986b),
who study the validity of the Modigliani Miller theorem and the existence of equilibrium and
shareholder agreement in a general incomplete markets context. As noted by the authors,
one could alternatively assume that the ﬁrm maximizes its share price according to some
valuation function that assigns a price process to a given stream of cash ﬂows. Further, as long
as this valuation does not predict security prices that allow for arbitrage opportunities, there
exist some positive present value prices λ ∈ Qst(q,d) such that the valuation conjectured by
the ﬁrm is equal to the objective function above.
The optimization problem under value maximization can be characterized by the follow-






t [fk(z(st+1),k(st),n(st+1)) + 1 − δ] (19)
The ﬁrst equation determines the equilibrium aggregate wage rate. Further, the second
equation determines the optimal production plan and it illustrates that the inter-temporal
investment decision in this economy is made by the ﬁrm.











and limits B =( Bi)i∈I.T h ee-economy is then described by Ee = {%,(k0,a 0,z 0,  0),Π,d a,B}.
Deﬁnition 2.2. The vector of processes {(ci,a i)i∈I,q,w,k} is a value maximizing CE
(VM CE) for Ee = {%,(k0,a 0,z 0,  0),Π,d a,B} if (i) for each i ∈ I and for each st ∈ N,
(ci,a i) is optimal under the preferences % given (q,w), (k0,a 0,z 0,  0), Π, da and B (ii) (w,k)
satisﬁes the ﬁrm’s optimality conditions for some λ ∈ Qst(q,d) (iii) all markets clear, i.e.,
6A discussion of unanimity under value maximization and an excellent survey on the existing unanimity
results is provided in Grossman and Stiglitz (1977, 1980). Further, see Duﬃe and Shafer (1986) for a discussion
of unanimity under value maximization in a general multiperiod setup, and Carceles-Poveda and Coen-Pirani
(2005) for a discussion of unanimity in a ﬁnite period version of the present setting.
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Several remarks are worth noting. First, the previous equilibrium deﬁnition implies that
the set of allowable present value processes Qst(q,d) that the ﬁrm can use to discount its
net cash ﬂows has to satisfy a ﬁxed point problem in the following sense. When the ﬁrm
discounts proﬁts with some λ that belongs to the set of admissible present value prices
Qst(q,d), its production choice k(λ) generates a new asset structure (q(λ),d(λ)) and a new
s e to fa d m i s s i b l ep r e s e n tv a l u ep r i c e sQst(q(λ),d(λ)) to which the original λ has to belong.
Thus, if we deﬁne a mapping from the admissible set of present value prices to the set of
present value prices that it generates, the equilibrium set of discount factors can be seen
as a ﬁxed point of this mapping. Moreover, if the set satisfying the previous ﬁxed point
problem is not single valued, the presence of incomplete ﬁnancial markets might generate
indeterminacy of equilibria with respect to the ﬁrm discount factor (see Duﬃe and Shaﬀer
(1986b)). Second, since the state process λ can be interpreted as the discount factor used
by the ﬁrm to value future net cash ﬂows, value maximization will generate shareholder
disagreement if λ does not agree with the valuation of the controllers of the ﬁrm. This will
be further discussed in a later section.
Alternative Firm Objective Criteria. Recognizing that value maximization ac-
cording to some consistent present value prices might generate shareholder disagreement, a
group of authors have proposed other criteria concerning the discount factor of the ﬁrm. In
particular, in a two period context, Dreze (1974) has suggested to use as a discount factor
a weighted average of the marginal rates of substitution of the diﬀerent shareholders, with
the weights reﬂecting the ﬁnal shareholdings. Further, Grossmann and Hart (1979) have
extended this idea to a multi-period setting, arguing that the weights should correspond to
the initial shareholder composition of each ﬁrm. In addition, Dreze (1985) and DeMarzo
(1993) have attempted to introduce a control mechanism to decide among alternative pro-
duction plans, implying that the ﬁrm should discount proﬁts with some weighted average of
the marginal rate of substitution of the controllers of the ﬁrm.





it ,w h e r eμi ≥ 0,
P
i∈I μi =1and mst+r
it is the marginal
rate of substitution of shareholder i ∈ I. Given this, they will be denoted as weighted
value maximization in what follows.7 Finally, recognizing that weighted value maximization
requires shareholder consultation that can be time consuming and costly, a second group
of authors simply have assumed the existence of a utility function for the ﬁrm, deﬁned
exogenously over state distribution of proﬁts. This objective will be denoted by utility
maximization in what follows, and important contributions here are due to Radner (1972),
Sandmo (1972), Sondermann (1974), and Leland (1972) among others.
Competitive Equilibrium with Shareholder Agreement. All the decision criteria








7Note that these objectives will only be equivalent to value maximization in the absence of binding portfolio
restrictions.
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In particular, value maximization assumes that uf(Nf)=Nf and λ ∈ Qst(q,d).W e i g h t e d
value maximization assumes that uf(Nf)=Nf,a n dλ is given by the weighted average of the
shareholders’ present value factors. Finally, utility maximization assumes that λ is ﬁxed and
uf is strictly increasing and concave. The next deﬁnition extends the previous e-economy
equilibrium concept to the general class of ﬁrm objectives deﬁned above, which include value
maximization as a particular case.
Deﬁnition 2.3. The vector of processes {(ci,a i)i∈I,q,w,k} is a CE for the economy
speciﬁed by Ee = {%,(k0,a 0,z 0,  0),Π,d a,B} relative to Uf if (i) for each i ∈ I and for each
st ∈ N, (ci,a i) is optimal under the preferences % given (q,w), (k0,a 0,z 0,  0), Π, da and B
(ii) (w,k) satisfy the optimality conditions of the ﬁrm under Uf (iii) all markets clear, i.e.,












It is important to note that the equilibrium concepts in deﬁnitions 2.2 and 2.3 do not take
into account the relationship between the investment decision of the ﬁrm and its ownership
structure. In other words, the investment decisions can potentially be made without taking
into account the preferences of the shareholders. To address this issue, we follow Duﬃea n d
Shaﬀer (1986b) and assume that a shareholder agrees on the production choice unilaterally
chosen by the ﬁrm if it maximizes his or her own utility. Formally, let the value of the
problem of the households be deﬁned as follows:
Ui(k)= m a x
{ci,ai}
Ui(ci) s.t. (6)-(8)





Let Ic ⊆ I be the subset of shareholders that have control over the ﬁr m .N o t et h a tw ec a n
now extend the previous equilibrium deﬁnitions to an equilibrium concept with shareholder
agreement, in the sense that all shareholders in the control group Ic support the production
plan chosen by the ﬁrm. To do this, we can replace condition (ii) in deﬁnition 2.3 with (ii)’
(w,k) satisfy the optimality conditions of the ﬁrm under Uf(Nf) and k solves (21) for all
i ∈ Ic. Further, if the ﬁrm has a value maximizing objective, we can replace condition (ii) in
deﬁnition 2.2 with (ii)’ (w,k) satisﬁes the ﬁrm’s optimality conditions for some λ ∈ Qst(q,d)
that coincides with the valuation of future cash ﬂows of all i ∈ Ic.
3. Equivalence of the Production Allocations
This section shows the equivalence of the set of equilibria in the two production economies un-
der value maximization. Throughout the section, we assume that the assumptions of section
two are satisﬁed. Further, we restrict our attention to equilibria where the aggregate invest-
ment plan satisﬁes a stronger version of the capital restriction in (3). In particular, we assume




















at all nodes. Note that this implies that productive dividends are bounded away from zero.





















at every node. Whereas this is typically satisﬁed in standard calibrated economies, it will
rule out price bubbles in the present setup.
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We start by stating several results that we will use to prove the main theorems, and
relegate most of the proofs to the appendix. To distinguish the allocations, the caret bearing
variables always denote k-economy allocations.
Proposition 3.1 Consider a CE for Ek or Ee. For each node st ∈ N and for each
security l ∈ L traded at st that is either (i) of ﬁnite maturity or (ii) in positive supply, we have




for all λ ∈ Qst(q,d).
Proposition 3.1 establishes the absence of price bubbles for securities that are of ﬁnite
maturity or in positive supply. Further, it implies that the discounted value of the aggregate
capital converges to zero as time goes to inﬁnity. These results can be established by showing
that our preference assumptions imply that bubbles cannot exist for any security that is
ﬁnitely lived or in positive supply and for any present value process λ ∈ Qst(q,d) such that
the present value of the aggregate labor endowment vwn(st,λ) is ﬁnite when this state price
process is used. This part directly follows from Santos and Woodford (1997), and we only
include the proof for completeness. Second, we show that the presence of trade in a claim
to productive activity implies that the present value of the aggregate labor endowment is
ﬁnite for any consistent present value process. To do this, we rely on the deﬁnition of the
productive dividend payments. Clearly, the previous two results imply that bubbles cannot
exist for any asset that is ﬁnitely lived or in positive supply8. The next lemma shows that
the aggregate capital stock chosen by a value maximizing ﬁrm in the absence of price bubbles
is equal to the ex-dividend ﬁrm value q1.
Lemma 3.1 If the e-economy ﬁrm discounts its net cash ﬂows with some λ ∈ Qst(q,d),
the equilibrium investment plan satisﬁes k(st)=q1(st)=vNf(st,λ) for all st ∈ N.
To prove the lemma, recall that the ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm’s problem under





t [fk(z(st+1),k(st),n(st)) + 1 − δ]
where λ ∈ Qst(q,d). Multiplying the previous expression with k(st), adding and substracting



















8As brieﬂy discussed by Santos and Woodford (1997), who study the existence of price bubbles in exchange














from zero. Further, we provide a direct proof of the absence of bubbles that just relies on the deﬁnition of the
productive dividend payments.
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The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of the previous equation has a well deﬁned limit,
and the second term converges to zero as T goes to inﬁnity by proposition 3.1. Thus, taking








t [Nf(st+r)] = vNf(st,λ)
On the other hand, the ex-dividend ﬁrm value is equal to the value of equity q1(st),w h o s e
dividends are given by d1(st)=Nf(st) at all st ∈ N. Further, since equity is in positive
supply, proposition 3.1 implies that q1(st)=vNf(st,λ) for all λ ∈ Qst(q,d),e s t a b l i s h i n gt h e
result.¥
The result of the previous lemma is crucial to establish the equivalence of the equilibrium
allocations in the two production economies. In particular, as shown by lemma 3.2 below,
it implies that the set of budget feasible allocations is the same across the two production
economies as long as they are characterized by the same preferences, initial values, transition
matrices for the shocks, ﬁnancial asset structure, portfolio constraints and production plans.
Lemma 3.2 Consider optimal allocations in the k-a n de-economies. Further, assume
that (k0,a 0,z 0,  0), Π,
¡
dl,ql¢
l≥2, B and k are the same. If the ﬁrm in the e-economy has
a value maximizing objective, the set of budget feasible allocations is the same in the two
production economies.
Lemma 3.2 shows that households in the k-economy can achieve the same consumption




l≥2 and a physical capital investment ki that is equal to the total equity investment
q1a1
i they would choose in the e-economy. If the production plan k is the same across the
two production economies, this asset choice generates the same ﬁnancial wealth, implying
that a consumption plan that is feasible in one economy is also feasible in the other. As
before, the result relies on the homogeneity of the production function, since it requires that





be a VM CE for Ee = {%,(k0,a 0,z 0,  0),Π,d a,B}.
















for Ek = {%,(k0,a 0,z 0,  0),Π,d a,B}.I n p a r t i c u l a r , b ki(st)=q1(st)a1
i(st) and b r(st)=
R1(st)/q1(st−1) for all st ∈ N.
Theorem 3.1 asserts that a value maximizing equilibrium in the e-economy is also an
equilibrium in a k-economy with the same characteristics. The argument of the proof is very
simple. We ﬁr s tn o t et h a tt h ek-economy aggregate capital stock b k is equal to the value of
the ﬁrm q1 in the e-economy, which is in turn equal to the e-economy capital stock k by
lemma 3.1. Given this, the returns on labor and capital deﬁned by (w,b r) satisfy the ﬁrm’s
optimality conditions in the k-economy, and lemma 3.2 implies that an optimal household
allocation in the e-economy is also optimal in the k-economy. Finally, market clearing in the
latter economy follows from market clearing in the ﬁrst. Theorem 3.2 below states that the














l≥2 , b w,r
o
be a CE for the economy speciﬁed
by Ek =
n
%,(b k0,b a0,z 0,  0),Π, b da, b B
o
. Then, there exist processes for a1
i,a n dq1 such that














l≥2 , b w,b k
o
is a VM CE for Ee =
n






b k(st) and q1(st)=b k(st)=
P
i∈I b ki(st)=b q1(st) for all st ∈ N.
Theorem 3.2 can be proved using similar arguments. In particular, since the aggregate
capital is the same in the two economies, the fact that q1 = b q1 implies that both economies
have the same asset structure and the same set of consistent present value prices. Given this,
the k-economy aggregate wage rate b w and aggregate capital stock b k,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes the no
arbitrage pricing condition in (4), satisfy the ﬁrm’s optimality conditions in the e-economy
for some λ ∈ Qst(q,d). Finally, lemma 3.2 implies that an optimal household allocation in
the k-economy is also optimal in the e-economy, and market clearing in the latter economy
directly follows from market clearing in the ﬁrst.
The previous two theorems imply that value maximization leads to the same dimension
of the set of equilibria in the two production economies. On the other hand, the equilibrium
in the e-economy might depend on the particular ﬁrm discount factor λ ∈ Qst(q,d) (see
Duﬃe and Shaﬀer (1986b)). As stated by the following theorem, however, if the equilibrium
with one period lived ﬁrms exists and is unique, the equilibrium under dynamic ﬁrms is
independent from the discount factor of the ﬁrm.
Theorem 3.3 If a CE in the k-economy exists and is unique, the e-economy VM CE is
invariant with respect to the ﬁrm discount factor λ ∈ Qst(q,d).
The proof of this theorem follows from the previous two. In particular, theorems 3.1
and 3.2 establish that the set of equilibria has the same dimension in the two production
economies. Thus, if we consider two equilibria in the e-economy that just diﬀer in the
discount factor chosen by the ﬁrm, the theorems show that they are also equilibria in the
k-economy. On the other hand, if the k-economy equilibrium is unique, the two e-economy
equilibria will clearly result in the same allocations.
4. Discussion
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 extend to an incomplete markets setting with general portfolio restric-
tions the result, well known under complete markets, that capital ownership is irrelevant
under value maximization. In other words, equilibria are the same wether the agents own
the capital and rent it to the ﬁr m ,o rw e t h e rt h eﬁrm, considered as an inﬁnitely lived corpo-
ration that is owned by the agents as shareholders, holds the capital stock. Several remarks
are worth noting.
First, in addition to the assumption of constant returns to scale in production, the results
require the standard assumption that agents are impatient, which implies convergence of the
present value calculations in equilibrium. To get some intuition for the previous ﬁndings
and for why these assumptions are needed, consider the investment decision in the two
production economies. In a k-economy with portfolio restrictions, the aggregate capital
stock is determined by the unconstrained households, whose marginal rate of substitution
between periods t and t +1is denoted by mst+1







the ﬁrst order condition of an unconstrained household, it follows that the capital














Similarly, consider an analogous e-economy where the investment decision is made by a
value maximizing ﬁrm. In the absence of price bubbles, a result that requires a suﬃcient
degree of impatience (see Proposition 3.1), the homogeneity of f(z,·,·):R2
+ → R+ implies






, as shown by Lemma 3.1. Given this, the aggregate investment plan in the e-economy













In essence, the results of section 3 can be seen as the equivalence of equations (22) and
(23). Note that this implies that a value maximizing ﬁrm in the e-economy will choose the
same capital stock as if households were making the inter-temporal investment decision in
the k-economy, and viceversa. Further, to see that our assumptions guarantee that this is
the case, consider the process m ∈ Qst(q,d),w h e r emst+r
t is deﬁned by the marginal rate of
substitution of the particular household that is unconstrained at each node between st and
st+r|st, and which may or may not be the same household every period. First, the absence
of price bubbles implies that we can substitute λ with m in equation (23). This is due to the
fact that q1 ¡
st¢




, which is uniquely deﬁned for all








)k(st). It therefore follows that equations equations (22)
and (23) are equivalent. In turn, this also implies that both economies will have the same
budget sets (see Lemma 3.2) and the same equilibrium allocations (see Theorems 3.1 and
3.2). On the other hand, since the assumptions needed are relatively standard in the macro-
ﬁnance literature, our results can be applied to a wide class of economies. Two important
extensions are brieﬂy discussed in what follows.
Second, theorems 3.1-3.3 can be easily extended to economies with (i) external ﬁnance
and (ii) heterogeneous ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst case, we assume that ﬁrms in the two production
settings can rise capital by issuing diﬀerent assets. In the second case, we assume that ﬁrms
diﬀer in their productivity process. In addition, the e-economy ﬁrms can also diﬀer in their
discount factors as long as they belong to the set of consistent present value prices, which is
common across ﬁrms. Using similar arguments to the ones in Proposition 3.1, price bubbles
can be ruled out in these two cases. In the presence of external ﬁnancing, we can then show
that the ex-dividend ﬁrm value in the e-economy, which is equal to the market value of the
assets in its capital structure, is equal to the economy wide capital stock. In the economy
with heterogeneous ﬁrms, we can then show that each ﬁrm j will set its investment level to







where λj ∈ Qst (q,d). Given this, the results
of Lemma 3.2 and Theorems 3.1-3.3 follow through in both cases.9
Third, in spite of the fact that a value maximizing ﬁrm in the e-economy chooses the
same production plan as if households were making the intertemporal investment decision,
this does not necessarily imply that the plan is unanimously approved by the shareholders
that belong to the control group Ic ⊆ I of the ﬁrm. In particular, a plan that is chosen by
a value maximizing ﬁrm will only be approved by the shareholders if the discount factor λ
9The proofs of these results can be found in the technical appendix accompanying the paper, which can
be provided by the authors upon request.
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coincides with the future cash ﬂow valuation of the controllers of the ﬁrm. On the other
hand, equation (23) implies that the valuation of the ﬁrm only coincides with the valuation
of future proﬁts of shareholders that are unconstrained every period. To see this, note that



















The ﬁrst equality represents that fundamental value of equity with respect to λ. Further,
since this is uniquely deﬁned for all consistent present value processes, the fact that m ∈








. Here, it is important to note that only the
marginal rate of substitution of a shareholder that is unconstrained every period belongs to
the set of consistent present value prices Qst(q,d). Given this, only if the shareholders that
belong to the control group of the ﬁrm are unconstrained, unanimity will obtain with respect
to value maximization. As an example, this would happen if the controllers of the ﬁrm were
subject to the present value constraint in (9), since it is eﬀectively never binding. On the
other hand, this implies that an equilibrium with shareholder agreement might not exist in
the presence of eﬀectively binding portfolio restrictions.
Note that this could have important quantitative implications related to the existing liter-
ature, since it opens the possibility for other ﬁrm objectives that diﬀer from value maximiza-
tion. In particular, several authors have shown that imperfect risk sharing in a k-economy
setting can lead to an increase in the aggregate capital stock with respect to its value under
complete markets due to precautionary savings (see e.g. Aiyagari (1994), Huggett (1997)
and Krusell and Smith (1997,1998)). On the other hand, our results suggest that ﬁrms and
households may make diﬀerent investment decisions in the absence of value maximization,
since the aggregate household savings, which are equal to the ex-dividend market value of
the ﬁrm, will diﬀer in general from the aggregate capital stock. A quantitative assessment
of the importance of the ownership of physical capital in such a framework is an important
issue that we leave for further research.
5. Conclusions
The present paper provides the conditions under which the irrelevance of physical capital
ownership that arises under complete markets still holds in an incomplete markets environ-
ment with general portfolio restrictions and possibly external ﬁnancing. It is shown that, if
ﬁrms undertake the inter-temporal investment decision to maximize their market value, the
equilibrium allocations are the same as in the standard setup where households make the in-
vestment decision and ﬁrms rent capital and labor to maximize proﬁts period by period. The
result requires that production functions are homogeneous of degree one in the two inputs
and that preferences exhibit a suﬃcient degree of impatience. Since these two assumptions
are relatively standard in the macro-ﬁnance literature, however, they can be applied to a
relatively general setup.
Whereas the ownership of physical capital is irrelevant under value maximization, this
objective might still lead to shareholder disagreement within the ﬁr mi nt h ep r e s e n c eo f
eﬀectively binding portfolio restrictions. The reason is that only the shareholders that are
unconstrained every period unanimously agree on the value maximizing production plan
chosen by the ﬁrm, opening the possibility for further analysis of shareholder agreement
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issues in the present context. Finally, it is also shown that the quantitative implications of
the absence of value maximization might diﬀer from the standard static ﬁrm setup. This
is due to the fact that the equivalence between the aggregate capital stock and the value
of the ﬁrm is broken in this case. On the other hand, since this seems to be more in line
with the data, the absence of value maximization might be a promising avenue towards the
explanation of several facts, such as the behavior of capital versus stock returns.
APPENDIX
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 . 1
(a) We ﬁrst show that, if there exists a state prices process λ ∈ Qst(q,d) such that the present
value of the aggregate labor income vwn(st,λ) is ﬁnite for every date-state st,t h e nql(sr)=vdl(sr,λ)
for all sr|st with r ≥ t and each security traded at date-state sr that is either (i) of ﬁnite maturity
or (ii) in positive net supply. To prove this, note that the preferences deﬁned by % and satisfying
assumption (A.6) have the following property. For each i ∈ I,t h e r ee x i s t sa0 ≤ γi < 1 such that
for any date state st ∈ N,
(c
−
i (st),c i(st)+wc(st),γc +
i (st)) Â (c
−
i (st),c i(st),c +
i (st)) (1)
for all consumption plans satisfying ci(sr) ≤ wc(sr) at each sr ∈ N and all γ ≥ γi. Here, Âi
denotes strict preference, c−
i (st) denotes the consumption coordinates at all nodes other than the
sub-tree nodes sr ∈ N such that sr|st,a n dc+
i (st) denotes the consumption coordinates at the nodes
sr ∈ N such that sr|st and r>t . Given this, if the plan (ci,a i) is optimal at q,w eh a v et h a t ,f o r
all st:
(1 − γi)q(st)0ai(st) ≤ wc(st) (2)
To see that equation (2) is true, suppose that (1−γi)q(st)0ai(st) >w c(st) for some st.H o u s e -
hold i could then choose the alternative plan (b ci,b ai):
(b c−
i (st),b ci(st),b c+




i (st),b ai(st),b a+
i (st)) = (a−
i (st),γiai(st),γia+
i (st))
w h i c hi sf e a s i b l ea n dw o u l db ep r e f e r r e dt o(ci,a i) by equation (1), contradicting the fact that (ci,a i)











To see that this is the case, we can multiply the date-state st budget constraint of consumer
i,s a t i s ﬁed with equality for each date-state given our assumptions on preferences, with some λ ∈
Qst(q,d) for which vw(st,λ) < +∞. Further, summing over all date-states st+r,w i t hd a t e s1 ≤
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λ(st+r)ci(st+r)+ l i m
T→∞










Since vwn(st,λ) < +∞ by assumption, it follows that vwi(st,λ) < +∞ for all i,a n dt h e
right hand side of the previous equation has a ﬁnite limit equal to λ(st)vwi(st,λ) < +∞.S i n c e
wn(st)+d(st)A = wc(st) and vdA(st,λ) ≤ q(st)0A<+∞, vwn(st,λ) < +∞ also implies
that vwc(st,λ) < +∞, and it follows that vci(st,λ) < +∞ for all i ∈ I.G i v e n t h i s , t h e ﬁrst
term on the left hand side of the previous equation also has a well deﬁned and ﬁnite limit equal
to λ(st)vci(st,λ) < +∞. Finally, since vwc(st,λ) < +∞ and wc(st+T) ≥ 0 for all date-states
st+T|st,w eh a v et h a tlimT→∞(1 − γi)−1 P
st+T|st λ(st+T)wc(st+T)=0 , which establishes the











Finally, substituting for c(st)=w(st)n
¡
st¢






t d(st+r)A ≥ q(st)0A (5)






t d(st+r)A ≤ q(st)0A (6)
Therefore, σ0(st,λ)A =0 ,w h e r eσ0(st,λ)=( σ1(st,λ),...σL(st,λ))0,a n dσl(st,λ)=0if
Al ∈ R++.N o t et h a t ,f o rﬁnite maturity securities, the result directly follows from their deﬁnition.
(b) We now show that vwn(st,λ) < +∞ and limr→∞
P
st+r|st λt+r
t k(st+r)=0for all st and




−k(st) ≥ 0 (7)
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Given that vd1(st,λ) ≤ q1(st) < +∞ for all st ∈ N and all λ ∈ Qst(q,d),w eh a v et h a t ,f o r






t [F(z(st+r),k(st+r−1),n(st+r))−w(st+r)n(st+r) − k(st+r)] < +∞ (8)
Suppose now that vwn(st,λ)=+ ∞ for some λ ∈ Qst(q,d). Since the previous inequality holds






t [F(z(st+r),k(st+r−1),n(st+r)) − k(st+r)] = +∞ (9)
On the other hand, equation (7) implies that the equity dividends can be expressed as a fraction
φ(st) of output net of investment, i.e., d1(st)=φ(st)x
¡
st¢




k(st)].L e tφ =i n f st φ(st) > 0, where the last inequality follows from the fact that the productive
dividend payments are bounded away from zero. Given this, we have that:













which contradicts equation (9). Therefore, it follows that vwn(st,λ) < +∞ for all λ ∈ Qst(q,d).







for all λ ∈ Qst(q,d), note that this directly follows from (a) in the k-economy. Further, to show that








≥ φ[F(z(st),k(st−1),n(st))]. This clearly implies that the ﬁrst inﬁnite sum in equa-











t k(st+r)=0for every λ ∈ Qst(q,d).¥
P r o o fo fl e m m a3 . 2
To prove the lemma, let b Fi(st) and Fi(st) be the set of budget feasible allocations at st in the










i(st) ≤ b ωi(st)

























Similarly, ci(st) ∈ Fi(st) if there exists a set of portfolio strategies (al
i)l≥1 such that, for all st and








































where we have used homogeneity of the production function and the fact that q1(st)=k(st) by






Let b ci(st) ∈ b Fi(st) and assume that the hypothesis of the lemma are satisﬁed. We now show
that a plan setting ci(st)=b ci(st) at each node is feasible in the e-economy. To see this, consider
any date-state st ∈ N.I fωi(st)=b ωi(st), households can choose the portfolio al
i(st)=b al
i(st) for
l ≥ 2 and q1(st)a1





























t) ≥ b Bi(s
t)= Bi(s
t)
Further, if household i ∈ I chooses this portfolio, his wealth at the beginning of next period will
be equal to:
ωi(st+1)= b wi(st+1)+[ fk(z(st+1),b k(st),b n
¡
st¢












b ci(st+1) is also feasible in the e-economy at date-state st+1|st. Finally, if the initial values are the
same, implying that k(s−1)a1
i(s−1)=b ki(s−1), the period zero wealth of household i ∈ I in the























)+( 1− δ)]b ki(s−1)=b ωi(s0)
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Since ωi(s0)=b ωi(s0), it follows that ci(s0)=b ci(s0) is feasible, implying that b ci(st) ∈ Fi(st)
at all st ∈ N. Conversely, assume that ci(st) ∈ Fi(st) and consider any date-state st ∈ N.I f
b ωi(st)=ωi(st), households in the k-economy can choose the portfolio b al
i(st)=al
i(st) for l ≥ 2 and
b ki(st)=q1(st)a1
i(st), achieving the same consumption allocation as in the e-economy at date-state













































Since b ωi(st+1)=ωi(st+1), we again have that ci(st+1)=b ci(st+1) is feasible in the k-economy
at date state st+1|st. Finally, since b ωi(s0)=ωi(s0), it follows that ci(s0)=b ci(s0) is feasible, and
ci(st) ∈ b Fi(st) at all nodes.¥
















with b r(st)=R1(st)/q1(st−1) and b ki(st)=q1(st)a1
i(st) for all
st ∈ N is a CE for Ek = {%,(k0,a 0,z 0,  0),Π,d a,B},n o t eﬁrst that the aggregate capital in the








where the last equality holds by lemma 3.1. Further, we have used the fact that a1
i generates market










satisfy the ﬁrm’s optimality conditions in the k-economy, where we have substituted for the labor
market clearing conditions and have again used lemma 3.1. Second, since (k0,a 0,z 0,  0),Π, da, B, ¡
ql¢
l≥2 and k are the same across the two production economies, lemma 3.2 implies that b Fi(st)=
Fi(st) for all i ∈ I and all st ∈ N.T h u s ,t h ef a c tt h a tci is optimal for each i ∈ I in the e-economy
implies that it is also optimal for each i ∈ I in the k-economy. In addition, the portfolio strategies
achieving this allocation, given by b al
i(st)=al
i(st) for l ≥ 2 and b ki(st)=q1(st)a1(st),a r eo p t i m a l .








i(st)+q1(st)a1(st) ≥ Bi(st)= b Bi(st)
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Finally, the fact that (ci,a i) generates market clearing in the e-economy implies that the alloca-




























This establishes the result.¥














l≥2 , b w,b r
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be a CE for Ek =
n
%,(b k0,b a0,z 0,  0),Π, b da, b B
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b k(st) and q1(st)=b k(st)=
b q1(st) i saV EC Ef o rEe =
n
%,(b k0,b a0,z 0,  0),Π, b da, b B
o
.T op r o v et h i s ,n o t eﬁrst that the absence






t [fk(z(st+1),b k(st),b n
¡
st¢
)b k(st)+( 1− δ)b k(st)]
for some b λ ∈ Qst(b q, b d), where we have substituted for:
b R1(st)=b r(st)b k(st−1)=fk(z(st),b k(st−1),b n
¡
st¢
)b k(st−1)+( 1− δ)b k(st−1)
Since q1(st)=b q1(st) and d1(st)=b d1(st) due to the fact that the aggregate capital stock is the
same in the two economies, it follows that Qst(q,d)=Qst(b q, b d). Therefore, the following values of






t [fk(z(st+1),b k(st),b n
¡
st¢
)b k(st)+( 1− δ)b k(st)]b k(st)




Second, since (b k0,b a0,z 0,  0),Π, b da, b B, b qa, b k are the same in the two economies, lemma 3.2
implies that Fi(st)=b Fi(st) for all i ∈ I and all st ∈ N. Therefore, since b ci is optimal for
each i ∈ I in the k-economy, it is also optimal for each i ∈ I in the e-economy. In addition, this
also implies that the portfolio strategies achieving this allocation al
i(st)=b al
i(st) for l ≥ 2 and
a1
i(st)=b ki(st)/b k(st), implying that q1(st)a1










i(st)+b ki(st) ≥ b Bi(st)=Bi(st)
Finally, the fact that {b ci,k i,(b ai)l≥2} generate market clearing in the k-economy implies that the
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This establishes the result.¥
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